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Caselaw: 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) 1,4 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court, and the 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the District Court erred in denying in part the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, and 
thus allowing the introduction of certain incriminatory statements allegedly made by Defendant. 
Specifically, the Defendant presents the issue of whether the District Court erred b}' not making 
factual findings as to whether the Defendant invoked his right to counsel and whether that right was 
denied Defendant, and thus erred by not addressing a specific grounds for suppression raised by the 
Defense. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by the trial court but no findings 
of fact appear in the record, the appeals court will assume that the trier of facts found them in accord 
with its decision and thus affirm the decision, if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find 
facts to support it. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991). However, there are 
instances in which the application of this assumption would be inappropriate. For instance, if the 
ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption unreasonable, the appeals court should remand for a 
new trial. See Ramirez at 788. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
The issue was preserved by a written motion to suppress filed by the Defendant. See Record 
at 108-120, 151-154. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was convicted by jury trial of Aggravated Arson, a first degree felony; three 
counts of Arson, second degree felonies; Burglary, a second degree felony; Attempted arson, a third 
degree felony; and Arson, a third degree felony. Judgments, Sentence, and Commitment were 
entered on or about April 30, 2003. See Record at 325-328. 
Prior to trial, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress certain incriminating statements allegedly 
made by him. See Record at 108-120, 151-154. That motion was denied in part and granted in part, 
by a written ruling issued by the District Court. See Record at 211 -217 (copy attached at Exhibit A 
to Appendix). 
The statements were recited by the Court in its written decision {see id,), as follows: 
1. The statement, "I took out Blackner's and Roland's for suire, but I did not 
set any of the others." This statement was made to Seargent Cameron Noel, of the 
Beaver County Sheriffs Office, and Agent Todd Hohbein, of the State Fire 
Marshall's Office. 
2. The statement, "I was just being a dumb ass." This statement was made 
to Deputy Cody Black of the Beaver County Sheriffs Office. 
3. A lengthy statement made to officers at the Beaver County Jail after 
Miranda. 
4. Statements made by the defendant over the telephone from the Beaver 
County Jail, to his mother which were recorded. 
5. A letter of apology written by the defendant from the County Jail and sent 
to some of the victims. 
See Appendix Exhibit A, Record at 211-217, p. 1-2. 
The District Court suppressed statement no. 1 set forth above as having been made prior to 
the Defendant having been advised of his Miranda rights, but not the remaining statements, since 
they were made after Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights. See id. at p. 4. 
The basis for suppression which the Defendant asserts in this appeal is that all interrogation 
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should have stopped once the Defendant invoked the right to counsel, and that the Defendant did in 
fact invoked his right to counsel by asking for a lawyer. In its written decision, the District Court 
did not make any findings of fact regarding whether the Defendant in fact invoked his right to 
counsel. See id.,passim. The Defendant did testify at the hearing on the suppression motion that 
he did in fact invoke his right to counsel. See Transcript of January 2, 2003 hearing on Motion to 
Suppress, Record at p. 350, transcript p. 72-73. The officer to whom the invocation request was 
allegedly made, Sergeant Cameron Noel, denied that the invocation was made. See id. at p. 20, 29. 
The Defendant did, through counsel, argue that the Defendant invoked the right to counsel, and that 
all the statements made by Defendant, as set forth in the numbered items from the Court's written 
decision above, were made after such invocation and thus should be suppressed. See Record at 114-
120,151-154. 
At trial, the statements as to which the Defendant's motion was denied were introduced in 
the State's case in chief, and the statements as to which the Defendant's motion was granted, were 
later introduced upon rebuttal after the Defendant testified during the defense's case. 
The Defendant/Appellant then filed this appeal. See Record at p. 336-337 (Notice of 
Appeal). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Court erred by not addressing whether the Defendant invoked his right to counsel in 
deciding the motion to suppress, an issue raised by the Defense in its motion, and as to which 
ambiguity existed due to the conflicting testimony elicited at the hearing on the motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENTS 
The District Court is required to address the issues raised by the Defendant in a motion to 
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suppress, such as the issue that statements should be suppressed because they were given after the 
Defendant invoked the right to counsel. 
The District Court failed to address this issue, and thus erred in denying in part the 
Defendant's motion to suppress. 
When factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by the trial court but no findings 
of fact appear in the record, the appeals court will assume that the trier of facts found them in accord 
with its decision and thus affirm the decision, if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find 
facts to support it. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991). However, there are 
instances in which the application of this assumption would be inappropriate. For instance, if the 
ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption unreasonable, the appeals court should remand for a 
new trial. See Ramirez at 788. 
In this case, because of the conflict in testimony between the Defendant and the officer, there 
is ambiguity which makes the assumption of a finding in favor of the State unreasonable, and this 
Court should remand for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand for a new 
trial. 
•V 
Dated this day of 
Randall C. Allen 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
A. Memorandum Opinion 
B. Judgment, Commitment and Sentence 
EXHIBIT A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL btStRKh1 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVE H. THOMAS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM (MNION 
CASE NO. 021500106 FS 
This matter comes before the court for decision on defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
The Motion was submitted for decision on February 12, 2003. Having now considered the 
evidence presented by the parties, and the memoranda filed, the court makes the following 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decisions. 
FACTS 
The complete factual setting surrounding the various statements which defendant seeks 
to suppress has been clearly set out in the Memorandum In Opposition filed by the State. The 
defense has not challenged the accuracy of that rendition of the facts. In addition, the recitation 
of the facts presented by the State is in keeping with the court's findings. 
The defendant seeks to prevent the introduction at trial of the following statements: 
1. The statement, "I took out Blackner's and Roland's for sure, but I did not set any of the 
others." This statement was made to Sgt. Cameron Noel, of the Beaver County Sheriffs 
Office, and Agent Todd Hohbein, of the State Fire Marshall's Office. 
2. The statement, "I was just being a dumb ass.M This statement was made to Deputy Cody 
Black of the Beaver County Sheriffs Office. 
3. A lengthy statement made to officers at the Beaver County Jail after Miranda. 
4. Statements made by the defendant over the telephone from the Beaver County Jail, to his 
mother which were recorded. 
5. A letter of apology written by the defendant from the County Jail and sent to some of the 
victims. 
The State's recitation of the facts includes unresolved conflicts in the testimony 
presented. After a full consideration of the testimony of the witnesses the court now makes the 
following findings of fact regarding the conflicts. 
Was there questioning by the officers before the first statement made 
by the defendant while the search warrant was being executed? 
When officers arrived at the defendant's home to serve the search warrant, they placed 
handcuffs of the defendant for officer safety. At that time he was standing in the front yard of 
his home. He had not been officially arrested at that point but he was clearly in the custody of 
the police officers. 
Shortly after defendant was handcuffed, Sgt. Noel arrived at the house. Agent Hohbein 
arrived about the same time. Together they approached the defendant. Sgt. Noel testified that 
he could not remember any questions being asked of the defendant about the fires that were 
under investigation. He recalled that the defendant simply volunteered the statement that he 
had taken out Blackner's hay stack and Roland Yardley's haystack. 
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On the other hand, Agent Hohbein recalled clearly and in detail the questions that were 
asked of the defendant there in the front yard and the responses given by the defendant. Agent 
Hohbein's testimony was that the defendant was questioned about setting the fires before he 
gave the incriminating statement and before he was advised of his Miranda rights. Agent 
Hohbein included that questioning in his report about the time of the questioning. He 
apparently has a clear recollection that the questioning occurred, while Sgt. Noel can only say 
that he does not remember any questioning. 
The court finds the testimony of Agent Hohbein to be the more persuasive, as he 
appears to have a more complete recollection of the conversation and took the time to record it 
in his report. Therefore, the court finds that the defendant's statement about taking out two of 
the haystacks was the product of police questioning prior to a Miranda warning. 
Was the defendant threatened with the loss of his children if 
he did not talk to the officers? 
The defendant has testified that Sgt. Noel threatened to take away his children and to 
turn them over to DCFS. No one else hear any such threats and Sgt. Noel denied making any 
such threats. 
The facts show that while the officers were still at the defendant's home, the 
defendant's wife arrived home. The officers turned the children over to her immediately. 
There was no attempt to contact DCFS or to remove the children from the care of their 
mother. 
The court is convinced that the defendant is misrepresenting the facts. Nothing in the 
evidence indicates any intent of the part of the officers to remove the children from the care of 
their mother. 
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Did Sgt. Noel allow the defendant to ingest "several" pills which 
affected the defendant's mental state during the later questioning at the Sheriffs Office? 
The defendant testified that at one point while he and Sgt. Noel were together inside the 
house where the search warrant was being executed, Sgt. Noel allowed him to take some 
medication to calm him down. His point seems to be that he took more than his prescribed 
dosage and that he was under the influence of those drugs when he made later statements and 
made his telephone call to his mother. 
The testimony of the defendant is contradicted by the testimony of his wife and Sgt. 
Noel. Sgt. Noel denied categorically that he gave any medication to the defendant to ingest. 
He did admit that he allowed the defendant to take his bottle of prescription drugs with him to 
the jail, where the administration of the drug could be overseen by the appropriate jail 
personnel. 
The defendant's wife testified that she went back into the house to retrieve the 
defendant's medication and handed him the bottle to take with him to the jail as the defendant 
was being loaded into the police car to be transported to the jail. That would, of course, be 
contrary to the rendition of the defendant, since he claimed to have been given the pills much 
earlier in the evening while he and Sgt. Noel were in the house. 
The court is convinced that the defendant is misrepresenting the facts regarding the 
administration of his medication inside the house by Sgt. Noel. 
Was defendant given proper notice that his statements to his mother from the jail 
were likely to be overheard by law enforcement and recorded? 
The State has produced in evidence a photograph of the very phone used by the 
defendant to call his mother. Directly above the telephone is a large sign which advises those 
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using the phone that conversations over that phone may be overheard and recorded. 
Nonetheless, the defendant chose to use the phone and to make incriminating statements to his 
mother, knowing that he was risking being overheard and perhaps recorded as he did so. 
The court also finds that the statements of the defendant to his mother were his 
voluntary statements and that he was not under the supervision of Sgt. Noel, or any other law 
enforcement officer during that telephone conversation. 
ANALYSIS 
Given the factual findings of the court, the first statement made by the defendant was 
the product of police questioning while he was in custody. Clearly, that statement must be 
suppressed during the State's case in chief. 
However, the evidence clearly indicates that the defendant was promptly and 
completely advised of his Miranda rights after that statement was made and that thereafter he 
made repeated voluntary statements to law enforcement officers, to his mother, and to the 
victims implicating himself in the setting of the fires. The court has found no evidence that he 
was under any pressure or deception when he made those later statements. There were no 
threats regarding the taking of his children, nor was he allowed to overdose on his prescription 
medication prior to some of the statements. At the time he made the statements to Deputy 
Black, to his mother, to officers at the jail, and to the victims, he knew that he had the right to 
remain silent and to have the advice of an attorney, but he chose to talk about the case 
voluntarily. His motion to suppress seems motivated by regret about his decision in view of 
the dire consequences that he is facing. 
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The law cited by the State, and uncontradicted by the defense, seems clear. Even 
though the initial statement of the defendant must be suppressed, the later statements given 
after a complete Miranda warning are not necessarily the fruit of the poisonous tree, as the 
defense has argued. Since the initial statements, and all those that followed the Miranda 
warning, were free of any coercive or deceptive activity by the police, the later statements are 
admissible during the State's case in chief. The first statement was the product of a technical 
violation of Miranda at most, and should not result in the suppression of statements given later 
after the defendant had been advised of his rights and had been given time to consider the 
importance of the warning. 
ORDERS 
The defendant's initial admission to Sgt. Noel and Agent Hohbein is ordered 
suppressed during the State's case in chief. The remaining statements of the defendant are 
admissible during the State's case in chief or any later point in the trial. 
DATED this 18th day of February 2003. 
J./ftlLIP EVES, Di^rict Court Judge 
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Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this 18* day of February 2003, I mailed true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Leo G. Kanell, Esq. 
Deputy Beaver County Attorney 
P.O. Box 471 
Beaver, UT 84713 
Randall Allen, Esq. 
Jensen, Graff & Barnes 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk 
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Criminal No. 021500106 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
This matter having regularly come on for hearing before the Honorable J. PHILIP 
EVES, District Court Judge on the 30th day of April, 2003, and the Defendant being present and 
represented by his attorney, RANDALL C. ALLEN, and Plaintiff being represented by LEO G. 
KANELL, Deputy Beaver County Attorney, and Defendant having been found guilty by a jury of 
the charges of AGGRAVATED ARSON, a first degree felony; three counts of ARSON, second 
degree felonies; BURGLARY, a second degree felony; ATTEMPTED ARSON, a third degree 
felony; and ARSON, a third degree felony, and the Court having reviewed the recommendations 
made in a pre-sentence investigation report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole, and Defendant's 
counsel having made a statement in mitigation of sentence and Defendant having been given the 
opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters the following JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, and COMMITMENT. 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, 
STEVE H. THOMAS, is guilty of the offense of AGGRAVATED ARSON, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Section 76-6-103; ARSON (3 Counts), second degree felonies, in violation of Section 
76-6-102(l)(b); BURGLARY, a second degree felony, in violation of 76-6-202; ATTEMPTED 
ARSON, a third degree felony, in violation of 76-6-102(l)(b); and ARSON, a third degree felony, 
in violation of 76-6-102(1 )(b), Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, 1953. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, 
STEVE H. THOMAS, is hereby sentenced to the Utah State Prison for five (5) years to life on the 
charge of AGGRAVATED ARSON; not less than one year nor more than fifteen years on the charge 
of ARSON (3 counts), second degree felonies; not less than one year nor more than fifteen years on 
the charge of BURGLARY, a second degree felony; not less than one year nor more than five years 
on the charge of ATTEMPTED ARSON, a third degree felony; and not less than one year nor more 
than five years on the charge of ARSON, a third degree felony. These terms are to run concurrent, 
one to the other. You are informed that the Defendant has served two hundred sixty-eight (268) days 
in jail while awaiting his jury trial and sentencing and it is the recommendation of the Court that this 
time be credited toward the Defendant's sentence. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant pay restitution to the victims, in the sum 
of $62,004.94. 
IT IS THE OPINION AND FINDING OF THIS COURT that the Defendant is in 
need of mental health counseling as soon as possible to aid the Defendant in resolving his ongoing 
mental health problems, so that when the Defendant does return to society he will be able to do so 
as a productive member. 
Defendant is advised that he had thirty (30) days from and after April 30, 2003, to 
make a motion to withdraw his plea or to appeal this judgment and sentence or any part thereof. 
Defendant is further advised that a plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon a 
showing of good cause and with permission of the Court. Any such appeal or motion shall be 
pursuant to the Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure and the laws of the State of Utah. 
COMMITMENT 
The person of said Defendant, STEVE H. THOMAS, is hereby committed to the 
custody of the Beaver County Sheriff for the purpose of executing the foregoing Judgment and 
Sentence and it is ordered that the Defendant be delivered to the Utah State Prison for the execution 
of said Sentence. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of April, 2003. 
J. PHILIP EVES 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Beaver ) 
I, DEBRA JEWKES, Deputy Clerk of said District Court of Beaver County, State 
of Utah, do hereby certify that the Honorable J. PHILIP EVES, whose name is subscribed to the 
preceding certificate is the Judge of said Court, duly commissioned and qualified, and that the 
signature of said Judge to said certificate is genuine. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
Court this %ft day of April, 2003. 
DEBRA JEWKES » 
Deputy Clerk of Fifth District Court 
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J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorneys General 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
